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Abstract
Norwegian parents of preschool children base their care choices on a
completely different choice set from their predecessor. Now there is essentially
only one type of nonparental care – center-based care – and on the parental
side fathers take a more pivotal role in early childhood care. In the present
paper we develop and estimate a joint labor supply and child care choice
model that takes account of these new characteristics, on the assumption
that this model points to current and future modeling directions for several
other economies too. Estimations suggest that the average wage elasticity for
mothers is 0.25–0.30.
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1 Introduction
Norwegian family policy has gone through major changes in the last couple of decades,
which implies that the conditions under which families with preschool children make
their choices have been substantially altered. Most importantly, we have witnessed
a massive expansion in the coverage rate of center-based care, in combination with
considerable reductions in parental fees. Norwegian policy-makers formalized this
through the so-called “child care compromise” (approved by parliament in spring
2003), which was a plan for eliminating queues at child care centers in combination
with a maximum monthly parental fee. By 2009, the policy initiative had resulted
in a market for center-based care through which the government could guarantee
all families of children older than 1 year access to a slot at a center. Further, the
maximum payment for 2017 is set at NOK 2,730 ($330 and €290)1 per month, which
means that less than 25 percent of the costs are paid by the parents. As expected,
this combination has effectively terminated other nonparental care alternatives, such
as care by paid childminders.
At the same time, and perhaps not entirely unrelated to the policy changes,2
parents’ preferences appear to have shifted towards a more gender-equal division
of parental care. There are various indications of this. Firstly, the gap between
mothers’ and fathers’ working hours has been clearly reduced over the last few
decades (Statistics Norway, 2018). Secondly, evidence presented in Kitterød and
Rønsen (2013) suggests that Norwegian fathers are playing a greater part in the
physical and emotional care of their children than before. For example, fathers with
small children spent much more time on household work in 2010 than in 2000. This
happens in a society in which, according to Hook and Wolfe (2012), the involvement
of fathers already (around the turn of the century) was substantially higher than in
Britain, Germany and the U.S. Thus, we assert that neglecting fathers as alternatives
to nonparental care when modeling parents’ decisions can no longer be justified.
These characteristics form the background for the development of a new joint
labor supply and child care choice model3 that we believe represents a modeling
option for several other economies too. In the new model, the involvement of fathers
in care is taken into account by letting the choice of nonparental child care be
affected by the working time of both mothers and fathers. This means that we leave
the standard approach of treating only mothers’ care as the alternative to paid care.4
1Average exchange rates for 2017.
2See Ellingsæter (2003) on the existence and implications of family policy feedback effects.
3See recent reviews of joint labor supply and child care choice literature in Blau and Currie
(2006), Kalb (2009), Del Boca (2015), and Morrissey (2017).
4Blundell et al. (2000), Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Mumford et al. (2018) are other studies
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When both parents’ working hours are endogenously determined, and when there is
flexibility in terms of work schedules, parents’ working hours may not overlap, and
there is no longer necessarily a fixed link between working time and the child’s time
in care outside the home.5 The so-called “fixed link assumption” between working
hours and hours in nonparental care (Ilmakunnas, 1993), which is often applied
in the joint labor supply and child care choice literature, can then be abandoned.
Along this line, ultimately, parents may choose to work shifts that enable them to
handle two (full-time) jobs in combination with little or no nonparental care.6 We
assert that a realistic decision model should allow for the possibility that parents
reduce the children’s time in nonparental care by choosing jobs with non-overlapping
working hours.
Time inputs as a determinant of care quality is a common approach in the
literature on structural joint labor supply and child care choice;7 see for example Blau
and Robins (1988), Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Ribar (1995), Wrohlich (2011), Apps
et al. (2016), and Gong and Breunig (2017).8 Given that the present institutional
setting only involves one type of nonparental care, it follows that a mix of parental
time and time in center-based care is a key factor of care quality. These inputs
are imperfect substitutes, and we believe that perceived relationships between care
options and outcomes, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills,9 are important for
parents’ perception of preferred care combinations.
Like Lokshin (2004), Kornstad and Thoresen (2007), Tekin (2007), Apps et al.
(2016), and Gong and Breunig (2017), we employ a discrete choice framework in
the estimation of the model. We exploit Norwegian micro data from a survey of
families’ child care preferences and work choices, obtained from the Child Care
Survey 2010 (Wilhelmsen and Löfgren, 2011; Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011). The survey
includes detailed information on family composition, parents’ main activity and
labor market status, socioeconomic background, and mode and intensity of child
care. Information on income (wages, transfers, etc.) and taxation are obtained from
that include male labor supply in the decision-making process.
5Non-overlapping working hours might explain the finding that reported hours in nonparental
care are often fewer than the time each parent spends at work (Blix and Gulbrandsen, 1993).
6Implications of nonstandard work for care choices are discussed by Kimmel and Powell (2006)
and Connelly and Kimmel (2007).
7Another line of research accounts for child care by including the fee enter in the budget
constraint of a standard labor supply model; see Blundell et al. (2000) and Doiron and Kalb (2005).
8Several studies, such as Blau and Robins (1988) and Powell (2002), seek to account for the
existence of a unpaid nonparental care alternative, such as care by grandparents. As we explain
later, we argue that this care option can be discounted in the present context. See also Blau and
Hagy (1998) on choices between specific modes of child care.
9As discussed by Todd and Wolpin (2003), Bernal (2008), Cunha et al. (2010), Bernal and
Keane (2011), Del Boca et al. (2014), Black et al. (2014), and Havnes and Mogstad (2015).
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the Income and Wealth Statistics for Households (Statistics Norway, 2017), and
linked to the survey by using unique personal identification numbers. The estimated
model is in turn applied to simulate responses to policy changes on labor supply and
demand for nonparental care. Effects of several policy changes are discussed, such
as an increase in the parental fee and the abolishment of the home care allowance
(cash-for-care) schedule.
We shall argue that our model represents a more realistic depiction of choices of
parents of preschool children in the Norwegian context by, to some extent, contrasting
it to estimation results and performance of a conventional model, i.e., a model where
fathers’ labor supply is exogenous. A detailed exposition of the specification and
estimation results of the alternative model can be found in Thoresen and Vattø
(2018). The specification of the conventional model is kept as close as possible to our
suggested up-to-date model, except for the endogenous labor supply of the fathers
and the possibility for parents to choose non-overlapping working hours.
Even though the Nordic countries seem to take the lead with respect to equal
parenting and support for center-based care (Datta Gupta et al., 2008), we believe
that our modeling framework is relevant for other economies too, and increasingly
in the years to come. For example, in Germany (since 2013) every family has a
legal claim to a slot in a publicly subsidized child care institution, and the parental
leave scheme includes a “daddy quota” (Geyer et al., 2015; Müller and Wrohlich,
2016), which we believe signals ambitions with respect to gender equality. We also
note that subsidies to child care centers recently have been increased in several
other countries, as in Canada (Quebec) (Baker et al., 2008), France (Givord and
Marbot, 2015), the Netherlands (Bettendorf et al., 2015), and Spain (Nollenberger
and Rodríguez-Planas, 2015). In the US, even though child care subsidy programs
are very different from typical European programs, and public provision of center-
based care is the exception rather than the rule (Blau and Tekin, 2007), one sees
signs of a more active policy. When the Child Care and Development Block Grant
was reauthorized in 2014 (for the first time since 1996), the goals of the program was
adjusted, asserting that a main ambition is to strengthen the focus on the quality of
care, which implies more center-based care (Krafft et al., 2017).
The paper proceeds in the following way. In Section 2 we refer to empirical
evidence to substantiate our two main assertions behind our modeling framework:
the increased coverage of center-based care and fathers taking a more pivotal role
in the parental caregiving. Section 3 presents a discrete choice model that builds
on the new choice set of Norwegian parents. In Section 4 we present the data and
the estimation results, whereas the results of an out-of-sample model validation are
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presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the model properties further by using
the model in various policy simulations, including providing elasticity estimates.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Changes in choice sets and preferences
Norwegian family policy has been an arena of substantial political controversy for the
last couple of decades. In particular, the cash-for-care reform, which was introduced
in 1998, generated a heated debate on the rationalization and directions of family
policies. The reform introduced monetary compensation for not using subsidized
care at child care centers, for parents of children aged 1 or 2. The three main aims
of the reform were that parents should be provided with more time to care for their
own children, to give families freedom of choice of care provider, and to equalize
public support to families, independently of care option (Ellingsæter, 2003). The
support equalization argument was strengthened by the fact that access to care in
centers at that time (late nineties) was severely limited.
However, since then, there has been a massive expansion in the child care center
participation rate in Norway, particularly for children under 3 years of age; see Figure
1. Policy-makers formalized their efforts to increase the supply of center-based care
through the so-called “child care compromise”, approved by parliament in spring
2003. The agreement included a plan for eliminating queues for care at child care
centers, and introduced a substantial reduction in child care fees, regulated by a
maximum monthly parental pay. For 2017, the maximum monthly fee is set at NOK
2,730 ($330, €290), which implies that the parental fee covers approximately 14
percent of the costs for children under 3 and approximately 25 percent for children
aged 3–5 (Lunder, 2015).10 It follows that gross child care fees, measured as a
percentage of the average wage, are very low in Norway compared to most other
countries (OECD, 2014).
Figure 1 shows that participation in center-based care is close to 100 percent for
children aged 3–5, and the majority of the youngest children (1- and 2-year-old) also
attend child care centers.11 These developments have implications for the design of
modeling tools to guide the policy-making in this field.12 Unpaid care alternatives
10The cost difference reflects the fact that care for small children involves a higher staff-to-child
ratio.
11Parents are usually on paid parental leave until the child is 1 year. Note also that the home
care allowance is still in place, but only for parents of children that are 1 year. At the time of the
introduction of this scheme (in 1998), the plan was to let the support be equal to the child care
subsidies, but that is currently not the case. In 2017, parents who do not use center-based care
receive NOK 7,500 ($910, €800) per month for the 1-year-old child.
12For example, the model presented in Kornstad and Thoresen (2007), with two types of
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Figure 1. Share of children (1–5) in center-based care, 1999–2014
Notes. The data source is Kindergarten Statistics Statistics Norway (2016), which is based on “Annual reports for
kindergartens as of 15 December”. All approved child care centers under the Day Care Institutions Act that receive
subsidies are in the sample.
(for working parents), typically care by grandparents or other relatives, are not
important in the Norwegian setting; this is also reflected in the data utilized in the
present study (from 2010).13
With respect to the parental part of the care, we instead suggest that the choice
set should be expanded, now letting care by fathers be an alternative. We argue that
a model without any time input from fathers is misleading in the present Norwegian
context. Firstly, the working pattern of Norwegian mothers is moving closer to
the labor output of their male counterparts (Statistics Norway, 2018). This has,
according to Miranda (2011), contributed to less difference in unpaid work across
genders. Secondly, Hook and Wolfe (2012) find that around the turn of the century,
Norwegian males took a greater role in the physical and emotional care of their
children, and had more egalitarian relationships with their partners than fathers
in other countries. They can therefore be described as examples of “new fathers”,
to use the terminology of Hook and Wolfe.14 Moreover, according to Kitterød and
nonparental care and a focus on choice set restrictions (because of queues in the market for center-
based care), obviously does not provide a good description of the decision-making of Norwegian
families any longer.
13Only 0.4 percent of children aged 1–5 are cared for by relatives (Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011).
14The central role of Norwegian fathers in caregiving is also reflected by the so-called “daddy
quota” of the parental leave scheme. The parental leave scheme is gender neutral, in the sense
that the schedule allots the minimum weeks to each parent: for 2017, it says that out of 49 weeks
(full coverage), each parent’s share is at least 10 weeks; otherwise families lose the weeks. It is this
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Rønsen (2013) this process is continuing: Norwegian fathers are more involved in
child care in 2010 than in 2000.15 This is also supported by the evidence reported
in Miranda (2011), showing that the gap in hours of unpaid work between males
and females has been reduced in the period from 1998 to 2009.
We interpret the pattern seen in Figure 2 and in Table 1 as corroborative
evidence of the importance of Norwegian fathers as caregivers. First, Figure 2
shows that there is rather strong dependency between mothers’ employment and
the use of nonparental care, but most importantly, given the present context, we
also see a relationship between fathers’ working hours and the use of center-based
care. Although there are relatively few males in the nonparticipation and part-time
alternatives, the figure signifies, for example, an increase in the use of nonparental
care (more full-time care) by the family when fathers move from part-time to full-
time work. Further, in Figure 2 (panels to the right) we show how shift work is
related to the use of center-based care for mothers and fathers, respectively.16 As
expected, we see that parents with nonstandard work are less inclined to have their
children in full-time care, and again we observe a correlation between care choices
and the work choices of fathers, although this not as clear as for mothers.
Next, in Table 1 we further explore how fathers’ working hours relate to non-
parental care options when conditioned on their partners’ working hours. In families
where mothers work (part-time, full-time or overtime) despite the fact that the
family makes no use or less than full-time use of center-based care, we see that
fathers work less and have more jobs with nonstandard working hours, compared
to the case when the children are in full-time center-based care.17 We read this as
indications of several fathers being actively involved in caregiving by parents. As we
soon will return to, in Section 3, we allow for parents reducing children’s time outside
home by choosing non-overlapping working hours – a line of reasoning which is
reinforced by assigning a role to the (intentionally) caregiving father. Alternatively,
one may see the pattern as revealed by Table 1 if fathers unintentionally are involved
in care because, for example, they face constraints in the labor market. In this case,
given an expectation that access to employment is a particular challenge for the low
educated, one would expect to see less education and lower wages among the fathers
minimum share that is often referred to as the “daddy quota”.
15Also, one may expect that policy changes themselves have contributed to this – for example,
that the introduction of the father’s quota in the parental leave scheme could have influenced
attitudes. However, according to Cools et al. (2015) no such traces can be found in data.
16Note that shift work is defined as work outside weekday hours between 6am to 6pm.
17The figures give support to paternal reduction in working hours when there is no use of
center-based care, whereas part-time care seems to go together with more shift work.
7
Figure 2. Observed relationships between employment of mothers and fathers and
the use of center-based care
Notes. Own calculations based on a sample (further described in Section 4) of households participating in the
Child Care Survey 2010 (Wilhelmsen and Löfgren, 2011; Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011). The allocation to different
employment categories is based on working hours 0 (“None”), 1–34 (“Part-time”), 35–41 (“Full-time”), and 41+
(“Overtime”). The distinction between daytime work and shift work is based on the latter category including
respondents with work outside the standard weekday hours between 6am to 6pm. Hours in the different care
categories are 0 (“None”), 11–35 (“Part-time”), and 36+ (“Full-time”).
involved in the child care. However, we see no signs of such patterns in the data.18
We accordingly suggest that an up-to-date joint labor supply and child care
choice model for the decision-making of Norwegian couples should let both parents’
working hours be endogenously determined, jointly with care choice. As both parents
contribute to the parental care, we loosen the relationship between the children’s
time in child care and parents’ working hours, the so-called fixed link assumption
(Ilmakunnas, 1993). In the next section we probe deeper into the specification of
the model.
18For example, when allowing different combinations of care choice and fathers working hours to
be explained by wage and education in regressions.
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Table 1. Labor market choices of fathers for different labor market choices of their
partners and family care choices
Center-based care
Employment, mothers Employment, fathers None Part-time Full-time
None Avg. working hours 38.7 39.4 38.0
Share of shift work 0.27 0.37 0.20
Observations 55 41 10
Part-time Avg. working hours 33.4 39.1 39.1
Share of shift work 0.18 0.27 0.21
Observations 28 222 131
Full-time Avg. working hours 33.8 39.5 39.8
Share of shift work 0.32 0.31 0.19
Observations 19 162 420
Overtime Avg. working hours 20.0 42.4 42.9
Share of shift work 0.50 0.29 0.14
Observations 2 17 69
Daytime Avg. working hours 35.6 39.1 40.3
Share of shift work 0.29 0.24 0.18
Observations 80 305 531
Shift Avg. working hours 37.6 40.1 38.5
Share of shift work 0.17 0.40 0.26
Observations 24 137 99
Notes. Own calculations based on sample (described in Section 4) of households participating in the Child Care
Survey 2010 (Wilhelmsen and Löfgren, 2011; Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011). The allocation into different employment
categories is based on working hours 0 (“None”), 1–34 (“Part-time”), 35–41 (“Full-time”), and above 41+
(“Overtime”). The distinction between daytime work and shift work is based on the latter category including
respondents with work outside the standard weekday hours between 6am to 6pm. Hours in the different care
categories are 0 (“None”), 11–35 (“Part-time”), and 36+ (“Full-time”).
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3 A decision model for families with preschoolers
3.1 Discrete choice framework
In the following we provide further details of our two-parent model of joint labor
supply and child care choice. The model is a unitary household model19 based on a
discrete choice framework, influenced by several studies using the discrete choice
formulation both in analysis of standard labor supply (Dagsvik, 1994; Aaberge et al.,
1995; van Soest, 1995; Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006; Dagsvik et al., 2014; Dagsvik and
Jia, 2016) and in joint labor supply and child care choice setting (Kornstad and
Thoresen, 2007; Apps et al., 2016; Gong and Breunig, 2017).
We depart from a modeling approach that shares similarities with Kornstad and
Thoresen (2007), where parents choose among job and child care alternatives. Each
job opportunity is characterized by a whole range of latent non-pecuniary attributes,
reflecting factors related to job satisfaction, in addition to observed variables, such as
wages and working hours. Similarly, the opportunities in the market for center-based
child care are characterized by fees and opening hours and attributes associated
with quality of care. However, several attributes of both jobs and care alternatives
are unobserved by the researcher.20
We argue that parents’ choice of labor supply and child care realistically can
be viewed as a discrete choice problem, where the choice is made from a set of
combinations of jobs in the labor market and slots in child care centers. Let
z (z = 1, 2, ..) index the (triple) combinations of child care alternative and job pairs
(for mother and father). Each combination has a set of observable characteristics
given by (hm, hf , sm, sf , q), where hm and hf denote hours of work for mother and
father, respectively, and q the hours spent in nonparental child care. Furthermore,
let sm and sf be dummy variables which indicate whether the jobs are shift jobs or
ordinary day time jobs; i.e., sk, k = m, f is equal to 1 if the job considered is a shift job,
and zero otherwise. It is assumed that each family has preferences for both observed
and unobserved characteristics of the jobs and child care centers, in addition to
consumption. The household makes choices conditioned on a number of observable
and unobservable restrictions. Before considering how this framework accounts
for unobservable constraints, let us first define the economic budget constraint.
Consumption for a given job and child care combination is defined by disposable
income, C = f(wmhm, wfhf , p, I), where f(.) is a function which transforms income
19An alternative, accentuated by considering the behavior of both parents, would be to adopt a
collective model approach, as seen in Apps and Rees (1988).
20In fact, the extent to which the agents themselves have good perceptions of care quality may
be unclear.
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from work, wkhk (k = m, f), costs of child care, p, and nonlabor income, I, into
disposable income, given that wm and wf are the offered wage rates for the mother
and father, respectively.
p is the fee for a child care slot which we do not allow to vary according to
hours of care, q. Although the definition of part-time care in Figure 2 and in Table
1 includes care in the interval 11–35 hours, the mass center is at the high end of
the interval, where we find families paying the full-time fee for a less than full-time
service. As we allow the families to face three discrete hours of care alternatives,
q = [0, 30, 40], the price is the same for 30 and 40 hours of care. Note that (as seen
in Section 1) the fee is low, the maximum payment for 2017 is 2,730 Norwegian
kroner ($330 and €290). In addition, child care expenses are deductible, which
means (in the year 2017) that the government pays 25 percent of the costs, limited
by an upper expenditure threshold.
Furthermore, choices are restricted by mother’s and father’s time constraints. We
cannot distinguish between parents’ “real leisure” time and the time they spend with
their children – recall that we only observe working hours and hours in nonparental
care. However, we assume that the preference for leisure is highly influenced by the
preference for spending time with children. Given that both parents are considered
to be taking care of the child, there is not necessarily a fixed link (Ilmakunnas, 1993)
between the parents’ working hours and the child’s time in nonparental care. Parents
can (at least to some extent) reduce children’s time outside the home by exploiting
working hour flexibility and working non-overlapping hours. The time restriction is
further loosened by allowing for parents choosing jobs with nonstandard working
hours (shift work). Ultimately, then, parents may be able to handle two (full-time)
jobs in combination with little or no nonparental care.
It follows from this that hours of parental care and hours in center-based care are
viewed as key determinants of overall care quality. Using time inputs as determinants
of care quality is a common approach in the structural joint labor supply and child
care choice literature (Blau and Robins, 1988; Michalopoulos et al., 1992; Ribar,
1995; Wrohlich, 2011; Apps et al., 2016; Gong and Breunig, 2017). Since we argue
that there is only one type of nonparental care, an essential part of the choice
problem of the parents involves finding the preferred mix between own care and
center-based care.
Next, we take into account that parents face a number of restrictions on their
choice among the triples of jobs and child care center slots. These restrictions may
vary across households. Let B(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) be the set of triples, z, with working
hours, job type (shift work or not) and care hours equal to (hm, hf , sm, sf , q) that are
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available to the household, and let b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) be the number of triples in the
choice set B(hm, hf , sm, sf , q). These are not observable, but we follow Dagsvik et al.
(2014) and Dagsvik and Jia (2016), who discuss how the probability of an observed
combination of hours of work can be specified in the absence of detailed information
about the latent non-pecuniary aspects of the alternatives in B(hm, hf , sm, sf , q).
The utility function is assumed to have the following structure
U(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q, z) = v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q) + ε(z), (1)
where v(.) is the deterministic part, whereas ε(z), z = 1, 2, ..., are iid random terms
with c.d.f. exp(− exp(−x)). When the economic budget restriction, is taken into
account, the utility function can be expressed as
Ũ(f(hm, hf , sm, sf , q, I), hm, hf , sm, sf , q, z)
= ṽ(f(hm, hf , sm, sf , q, I), hm, hf , sm, sf , q) + ε(z).
(2)
It then follows that the probability of the household shall choosing jobs and non-
parental care alternatives with corresponding characteristics equal to (hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
is given by
P (hm, hf , sm, sf , q) =










exp(v(f(.), d, j, u, x, y) + log b(d, j, u, x, y)) . (3)
Note that the choice probability in Equation 3 differs from the standard multinomial
logit formulation, for example as in the labor supply model of van Soest (1995), in that
the systematic part of the utility function is modified by the term b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q).
As already seen, the term b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) accounts for a key feature of the choice
problem, namely that the household faces latent choice restrictions and that there
are more alternatives with specific observable attributes. For example, in the
labor market, there are more jobs characterized by full-time working hours. The
specification of b is further explained in the next subsection.
3.2 Econometric specification
In this section we further specify the functional form of preferences, v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q),
and opportunities, b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q). We assume that the systematic part of the
utility function, v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q), we assume that it can be separated into four
different parts:
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v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q) = v1(C) + v2(hm, hf , sm, sf )
+v3(q) + v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q).
(4)
Thus, in addition to consumption, v1, and leisure (non-work), v2, we let the “quality of
care part” be represented by two components: care in centers, v3, and an interaction
term, v4, that captures the relationship between center-based care and work (or
leisure). The components will be further explained in the following.
When C0 is a (fixed) subsistence level of consumption, v1(C), is further specified
as
v1(C) = α0(f(wmhm, wfhf , p, I)− C0) + α1(f(wmhm, wfhf , p, I)− C0)2, (5)
where f (.) = wmhm +wfhf +I−p−T (wmhm, wfhf , p, I), where T denotes taxation.
As already discussed, we do not let fees, p, vary with hours of care (q). Moreover, to
simplify, we measure p only for the youngest child. However, child care expenses for
older children are taken into account in the budget constraint, under the assumption
that the children are in full-time center-based care.21 The price structure reflects
discounts for siblings too. The subsistence level of disposable income, C0, is entered
into the specification of consumption, given by a fixed amount (NOK 60, 000
√
2),
and then normalized by dividing by 10, 000
√
2.22
The empirical literatue on discrete choice of labor supply, see references in Section
3.1, differs with respect to assumptions about wage heterogeneity. For example,
Aaberge et al. (1995) let wage rates vary across jobs, but assume that there is no
unobserved variation across individuals. In contrast, Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and
Dagsvik et al. (2014) assume that wage variation is due solely to person-specific
characteristics. Here, we follow the latter approach, also because the evidence
presented in Dagsvik and Jia (2016) provides support for this alternative. Thus, it is
assumed that the offered wage rates, wm and wf , do not vary across jobs (including
between shift and daytime jobs), but only across individuals.
Further, we operationalize the preferences for leisure (or non-market time),
v2(hm, hf , sm, sf ), as
v2(hm, hf , sm, sf ) = β1log lm + β2log lf + β3log lf log lm
+β4(1− sf )(1− sm)log lf log lm,
(6)
21Figure 1 provides support for older children predominantly spending their time in center-based
care.
22This normalization does not affect results, but helps to achieve convergence in the estimation
of the model.
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where lm and lf are specified by lk = l̄−hkl̄ , k = m, f , given that l̄ is the maximum
number of hours available, set as 80 hours. In practice, we let the choice set of working
hours for both parents consist of four alternatives, hk = [0, 20, 37.5, 45], k = m, f . It
follows from Equation 6 that β1 and β2 reflect the mother’s and father’s preference
for leisure. Taste modifying characteristics in the specification of preference for
leisure are included, for mothers and fathers, such that β1 = β10 + Xmrβ1r and
β2 = β20 + Xfrβ2r, where β10 and β20 are constants and β1j and β2j are vectors of
parameters. r denotes the taste modifiers, which include age, immigrant status, an
indicator variable of low/high education, and the number of preschool children in
the household. β3 and β4 measure interactions between the spouses’ preferences
for leisure, i.e., that there may be additional utility from leisure when the spouse
or partner also enjoys a substantial amount of leisure. Note also that we allow for
differences in interaction of leisure between spouses, dependent on one of the spouses
working shifts (β3) and both holding jobs with a standard work schedule (β3 + β4).
Thus, we allow for a possible joint utility of “not working” for the spouses. One
reason may simply be that the spouses want to spend time together when taking
care of children. This raises the question of whether parents’ leisure consumption is
a substitute or a complement in the family’s demand for care quality, as discussed
by Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003), Connelly and Kimmel (2009), and Bloemen
and Stancanelli (2014). Both Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) and Connelly and
Kimmel (2009) find evidence of complementarity in parental time use.23 We return
to this issue in Section 6, when we discuss cross-wage elasticity estimates.
The specification of preferences for nonparental care, v3(q), is based on time
spent in center-based care, given by a quadratic function,
v3(q) = (γ00 + γ01age)q + (γ10 + γ11age)q2, (7)
where the choice alternatives in center-based care are given by q = [0, 30, 40],
normalized to [0, 0.75, 1]. These discretizations are influenced by the observed
distributions; see Figure A.1 in the Appendix. We let preferences vary with the age
of the child (age), by defining two parameters, γ0 = γ00+γ01age and γ1 = γ10+γ11age,
where γ00 and γ10 are constants. As most parents prefer a combination of parental
and nonparental care, we expect that there are positive and decreasing returns on
time spent in centers.
As already discussed, we expect that there is a relationship between parents’
23This also relates to the question of bargaining within the household more fundamentally, as
discussed by Chiappori (1992), Apps and Rees (1997) and Browning and Gørtz (2012). Here, such
complications are ignored.
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choice of leisure and their preferences for care quality. To incorporate this element
in the modeling framework, an interaction term between preference for leisure and
preference for care in centers is specified, given by v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q):
v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) = (δ11log lm + δ21log lf + δ31sm + δ41sf )q
+(δ12log lm + δ22log lf + δ32sm + δ42sf )q2.
(8)
After rearranging and defining δi = δi1 + δi2q, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, we get
v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) = δ1qlog lm + δ2qlog lf + δ3qsm + δ4qsf . (9)
The present framework thus relates to several studies highlighting the effects of
parents’ time use in child development. Both Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Bernal
(2008) let mothers’ time input influence child outcomes. More importantly, given
the “gender equal society” point of departure, both mothers and fathers are taken
into account in Equation 8. Also in the care production process of Del Boca et al.
(2014) both parents contribute to the outcome.
Recall that an idiosyncrasy of the present approach is that we also specify and
estimate the number of triples in the choice set, b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q). As b(.) is not
observed, it is estimated simultaneously with the systematic part of the utility
function. We assume that the choice set is made up of three components:
log b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) = b1(hm, hf ) + b2(sm, sf ) + b3(hm, hf , sm, sf , q). (10)
b1 accounts for characteristics of the standard job market, b2 characterizes shift
work opportunities, whereas the last term, b3, is intended to capture restrictions on
particular combinations of work and care.
First, we let the number of jobs with full-time working hours (full), and the
number of options in nonparticipation (no) differ as follows:24
b1(hm, hf ) =

gno,k if hk = 0, k = m, f
gfull,k if hk = 37.5, k = m, f
0 else
(11)
Thus, we open up for differences in the number of possibilities in nonparticipation
and in full-time, represented by the latent variables gno,k and gfull,k, respectively.
24Note that it is not perfectly clear what the number of options in the nonparticipation/home
care alternative in reality represents. One can not rule out the possibility that the g’s may pick up
factors which in reality belong to preferences.
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Further, we allow the available number of “shift jobs”, relative to the number of
regular daytime jobs to vary with the individuals’ field of education (edufield), seen
as
b2(sm, sf ) = ς1(sm × edufieldm) + ς2(sf × edufieldf ). (12)
There are expected to be relatively more shift work opportunities for some types of
educational background. For example, it is well-known that there are more part-time
jobs in the health sector than in other areas, which is assumed to be accounted for
by the type of education.
Finally, we expect that there are not so many job/care combinations that allow
parents to combine two full-time jobs with less than full-time center-based care.
The last term of Equation 10, b3(hm, hf , sm, sf , q), accounts for this possibility by
defining a latent variable, κ, as
b3(hm, hf , sm, sf , q) =

κ if q < min(hm, hf ) ∧ min(sm, sf ) = 0
or if q = 0 ∧ hm+hf2 ≥ 30 ∧ min(sm, sf ) = 1
0 otherwise
(13)
Thus, κ reflects that there might be limitations with respect to combinations that
involve fewer hours in center-based care than parents’ working hours (upper line
of Equation 13). Further, if at least one parent does shift work, we expect that
there are fewer options which allow for full-time work by both parents (or close to
full-time: ≥ 30 on average) in combination with no nonparental care (second line of
Equation 13).
The separation of effects into preferences and opportunities is based on assump-
tions and functional form, and we can therefore not rule out the possibility that the
opportunity parameters partly reflect (systematic) differences in preferences across
choices. Similarly, estimates of preferences may also capture “opportunity patterns”
in the economy. However, as long as preferences and opportunities are not affected




4.1 Description of data
In the estimation of the model we use data from the Child Care Survey 2010,
which maps child care preferences for about 3,000 households (Wilhelmsen and
Löfgren, 2011; Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011). The survey includes detailed information
on family composition, main activity/labor market status of parents, socioeconomic
background, and mode/intensity of child care. Information on reported income
(wages, transfers, etc.) and tax payments is obtained from Income and Wealth
Statistics for Households (Statistics Norway, 2017), and linked to the Child Care
Survey by using personal identification numbers.
We limit the dataset to couples with at least one child in the age group 1–5
years.25 After excluding couples in which one parent is either a student, unemployed,
self-employed, or the recipient of parental leave payments, we are left with 1,176
households. Low income families and immigrants are oversampled, but this is not
critical with respect to the estimation of the model. However, when results are
used in simulations of policy changes, representativity is achieved by the use of
weights. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the model
estimation.
Recall that we assume that child care prices do not vary with respect to use; see
Section 3. Table 2 shows that most parents pay for a full-time center-based care
service, as the average contractual hours in care is approximately 42 hours, but on
average use it fewer hours, approximately 33 hours. This has previously been found
by Blix and Gulbrandsen (1993). We take this as corroborative evidence of parents
having strong preferences for spending leisure time with their children, although the
price for nonparental center-based care is 0 at the margin. Some parents reduce their
working hours to spend more together with the child(ren), but a main assumption of
the present analysis is that it is possible to exploit the flexibility of the labor market
to reduce hours in nonparental care, and instead increase the parental care time.
Individual wages, reported in Table 2, are obtained from OLS wage regressions,
for mothers and fathers; see estimation results in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
As described in Section 3, we assume that families choose among four working
hour alternatives and two work time schedules (daytime or shift), for both the
mother and the father. Furthermore, they choose among three nonparental care
alternatives: no participation, part-time and full-time.26 Figure 3 describes how
25Recall that parents normally are on parental leave in the first year after birth, and children
are therefore usually older than 1 year when entering into center-based care.
26In total we end up with 147 combinations in the choice set. Each parent has 7 work alternatives:
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation of the model
Mother Father
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 34.1 4.80 36.8 5.50
Years of education 13.3 2.70 13.4 2.55
Immigrant dummy 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.42
Working hours per week 31.1 12.5 39.4 7.44
Wage rate (per hour) 211.1 48.3 289.5 53.7
Shift dummy 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
Youngest child (1–5 years)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 2.54 1.29 1 5
Hours in center-based care 32.6 12.2 0 50
Contractual hours in center-based care 41.9 14.8 0 62.5
Household
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of children 1–5 years 1.40 0.54 1 3
Non-labor income 67,493 137,920 -147,250 2,926,443
Number of household observations 1,176
Notes. Data retrieved from the Child Care Survey 2010 (Wilhelmsen and Löfgren, 2011; Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011).
Average exchange rates for 2010 were used to convert income and wage measures to euros and US dollars: 1€=NOK
8.01, and 1$=NOK 6.05.
mothers and fathers in our sample are distributed by categories of working time,
working time arrangements and use of center-based care (for the youngest child).
Figure A.1 in the Appendix provides further details on how these discretizations
relate to the observed choices. A tax-benefit model is utilized to derive after-tax
income for each alternative state.27
3 categories of working hours in standard work and shift work, respectively, plus the “no work”
alternative. The 49 work combinations of the couple are combined with three nonparental care
options.
27The calculation takes into account that child care expenses are deductible up to a threshold in
the income tax return.
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Figure 3. Observed labor market and child care choices
Notes. The allocation into different employment categories is based on working hours 0 (“None”), 1–34
(“Part-time”), 35–41 (“Full-time”), and 41+ (“Overtime”). The distinction between daytime work and shift work
is based on the latter category including respondents with work outside the standard weekday hours of between
6am and 6pm. Hours in the different care categories are 0 (“None”), 11–35 (“Part-time”), and 36+ (“Full-time”).
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4.2 Parameter estimates and model fit
Parameters of the utility function, given by Equations 5, 6, 7, and 9, and the
opportunity measure, given by Equations 11, 12, and 13, are estimated simultaneously
by maximum likelihood. Table 3 reports estimates of the main parameters of the
model, whereas Table A.2 in the Appendix shows estimates for the full set of
parameters. First, we note that not all parameters are statistically significant.
However, when the model is employed to simulate effects of alternative policies, we
use the parameter point estimates, although not all of them are strictly significant
(in a statistical sense).
The utility function behaves well, as preferences for both consumption and leisure
are positive, and the estimate of α1 suggests decreasing returns with respect to
consumption (although not statistically significant). Given that leisure to a large
extent is spent on giving care to children, it is worth noting that the valuation of
leisure is higher for mothers than for fathers, and only statistically significant for
mothers.
Recall that the modeling framework opens up for the couple having preferences
for joint parental care, represented by an interaction term in leisure, see Equation 6.
The estimation results show that the common interaction term is clearly insignificant
(β3), but that there is positive valuation from both parents having standard working
time schedules (β4). Further, with respect to the preferences for child care, estimates
of γ0 and γ1 imply that parents attain positive utility of having their children in
nonparental care, but at a decreasing rate. This is expected, since we observe that
parents tend to underutilize nonparental care, i.e., using it less than the opening
hours. With respect to the interaction of preferences for nonparental care and leisure,
the estimation results suggest a negative relationship, which fits with a scenario
where parents use their leisure time caring for their kids (however, note that only the
negative interaction for mothers’ leisure, δ1, is significant). Thus, even though the
Norwegian males are found taking an important role in the upbringing of children,
the estimated parameters of preferences suggest that there are still gender differences
between Norwegian parents. We will return to this issue soon, when discussing
how preferences for nonparental care vary with respect to the parents’ labor market
choices.
Estimates of the opportunity parameters are interpreted against the excluded
alternatives. It then follows that the estimates of job opportunities for standard
working hours, exp(gno,k=m,f) and exp(gfull,k=m,f), are measured against the ex-
cluded alternatives, part-time and overtime work, both set to exp(0) = 1. The
estimates reported in Table 3 then signify that there are more jobs with full-time
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work schedules, as expected. In contrast, the estimates of opportunities for nonpartic-
ipation alternatives are negative, which implies that there are fewer nonparticipation
alternatives than the left out alternatives.28 Similarly, the estimates for shift work,
ς0 and ς1, seem to suggest that there are less job options within this job category.
The last component of the choice set specification is a latent variable, κ, repre-
senting limitations in the possibilities for combining full-time work and less than
full-time care; see Equation 13. In Table 3 this is referred to as “decoupling”. We
see that the estimate of exp(κ) = 0.85 is close to 1 and statistically insignificant.
Thus, the anticipation that the agents face fewer combination when parents want to
combine less nonparental care and full-time (or close to full-time) work, might not
be binding.
As explained in the Introduction, we have also estimated a version of our model
in which we diverge from the key role of fathers as care providers and consequently
let their labor supply enter the model exogenously, referred to as the conventional
approach. We refer to Thoresen and Vattø (2018) for further details of the alternative
model, together with estimation results. A likelihood ratio test has been conducted
to assess to whether our preferred model outperforms the alternative nested model,
with “standard fathers” – the test gives clear support for our augmented model.
Figure 4 displays the actual frequencies of the different combinations of working
time and child care modes for mothers and fathers, respectively, and the correspond-
ing probability distribution based on model simulations. The simulated probabilities
are derived by calculating the average probability for each state based on the individ-
ual probabilities. We see fairly close correspondence between the actual distribution
and the model predictions.29
To further highlight the novel role of fathers in the present model, Figure 5 shows
how the model predicts fathers’ labor supply choices, depending on the (predicted)
choices for mothers’ labor supply and nonparental care.30 A model without assigning
a role for fathers as caregivers would show no differences in care choices across fathers’
labor supply choices, i.e., the bars, reflecting family care choices, would be identical
for “None”, “Part-time”, “Full-time”, and “Overtime” for each category of mothers’
labor supply. The pattern displayed in Figure 5 then diverges considerably from
the results of a restricted (or nested) model: the model results suggest substantial
dependency between care choices and fathers’ labor supply.
28For practical reasons, part-time and overtime work are the benchmark alternatives in the
present specification, instead of the non-working alternative. This reflects a choice of normalization
and does not influence results.
29A similar figure for the conventional model suggests weaker fit, see Thoresen and Vattø (2018).
30Thus, close to a “prediction” counterpart to the description of actual choices in Table 1.
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Table 3. Results of the estimation of the decision model
Variables Parameter Estimate Std. error
Preference, v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Consumption, v1(C)
Intercept α0 0.1462∗∗∗ (0.0319)
Squared term α1 -0.0002 (0.0001)
Leisure, v2(hm, hf , sm, sf )
Mother’s leisure β1 11.9354∗∗∗ (1.7752)
Father’s leisure β2 3.4543 (1.8071)
Interaction β3 -0.2739 (1.0996)
Interaction, standard schedules β4 1.7512∗∗∗ (0.3871)
Nonparental child care, v3(q)
Intercept γ0 4.1333 (2.1744)
Squared term γ1 -5.9967∗ (2.0562)
Care int., v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Mother’s leisure δ1 -5.8906∗ (2.2930)
Father’s leisure δ2 -2.5697 (3.1319)
Shift work, mother δ3 -0.2442 (1.1075)
Shift work, father δ4 0.2718 (1.0651)
Opportunity, b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Nonparticipation, mother gno,m -1.6315∗∗∗ (0.2127)
Nonparticipation, father gno,f -0.1307 (0.3877)
Full-time, mother gfull,m 1.4244∗∗∗ (0.0883)
Full-time, father gfull,f 1.5965∗∗∗ (0.0794)
Shift work, mother (mean) ς1 -0.5247 (0.5438)
Shift work, father (mean) ς2 -0.9806∗ (0.4221)
Decoupling work/care κ -0.1687 (0.1644)
Number of observations 1,176
Notes. Standard errors are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. The leisure of mothers and fathers is interacted
with the individual’s age, immigrant status, education and number of preschool children. Nonparental child care
is interacted with the age of the child to capture the fact that (perceived) child care quality at home, compared to
nonparental care, may depend on the age of the child. The shift work opportunity measure is interacted with field
of education. ∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 4. Model fit: distributions of predicted and observed choices
Notes. The allocation into different employment categories is based on working hours 0 (“None”), 1–34 (“Part-
time”), 35–41 (“Full-time”), and 41+ (“Overtime”). The distinction between daytime work and shift work is based
on the latter category including respondents with work outside the standard weekday hours between 6am to 6pm.
Hours in the different care categories are 0 (“None), 11–35 (“Part-time”), and 36+ (“Full-time”).
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Figure 5. Predicted family care choices for different predicted choices of hours of
work for mothers and fathers
Notes. The allocation into different employment categories is based on working hours 0 (“None”), 1–34 (“Part-
time”), 35–41 (“Full-time”), and 41+ (“Overtime”). The distinction between daytime work and shift work is based
on the latter category including respondents with work outside the standard weekday hours of between 6am and
6pm. Hours in the different care categories are 0 (“None”), 11–35 (“Part-time”), and 36+ (“Full-time”).
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Table 4. Estimated (deterministic) preferences for nonparental child care, dependent
on labor market choices and age of youngest child
Preference for center-based care
None Part-time Full-time
Average 0.00 2.91 (0.24) 3.14 (0.24)
Mother and father choose full
daytime work 0.00 3.46 (0.31) 4.49 (0.34)
Mother chooses shift work 0.00 2.90 (0.25) 2.48 (0.27)
Father chooses shift work 0.00 3.13 (0.35) 3.13 (0.35)
Mother chooses not to work 0.00 1.04 (0.16) -0.40 (0.17)
Mother chooses part-time work 0.00 2.18 (0.18) 1.75 (0.17)
Father chooses part-time work 0.00 2.22 (0.26) 2.22 (0.36)
Age of youngest child
1 year 0.00 1.74 (0.22) 1.87 (0.25)
5 years 0.00 4.80 (0.39) 5.15 (0.33)
Number of observations 1,176
Notes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. In cases where results are
reported for choices of one of the spouses, average values for the other spouse is used.
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Next, we discuss the performance of the model by describing valuations of
nonparental care for different labor market choices and with respect to the age of
the youngest child, see Table 4. We do this by using Equation 7 and Equation 8
and the accompanying parameter estimates. Table 4 shows that parents on average
value full-time nonparental care higher than part-time care. Thus, the parents are
still on the increasing part of the concave (nonparental) care function. Further, with
respect to the age of the child, Table 4 shows that the valuation of center-based care
increases with age, as expected.
However, the main information derived from Table 4 comes from looking at how
these valuations are altered by different choices by fathers and mothers, interpreted
as preference differences between mothers and fathers. Although, in the motivation
for the present work, we have stated that Norwegian males are well on the way to
a gender-equal position, the results in Table 4 indicate that there are still some
differences. Mothers’ and fathers’ valuation of care for the shift work and part-time
work alternatives signify the differences between genders. Whereas for mothers,
full-time center-based care is valued below part-time care for other choices than
full-time work, valuations of part-time and full-time center-based care are identical
when fathers’ choices deviate from standard full-time work. Given that we let
nonparental care quality perceptions vary according to the leisure of fathers and
mothers, see Equation 8, we interpret these results as being generated by higher
valuations of mothers’ care than fathers’ care. This does not mean that fathers are
unaffected, as implied by a conventional model (as the one discussed in Thoresen
and Vattø, 2018):31 for example, we see that the value of the full-time care option
when fathers work part-time is lower than the average figure (upper line of Table
4). Yet, these results suggest that the preferences for nonparental care are still
more connected to mothers’ than fathers’ working time decisions. Thus, Norwegian
fathers may still have a way to go before they are involved in caretaking at the same
level as their female counterparts.
4.3 Robustness checks - accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for
nonparental care
So far, individuals with identical observed characteristics are assumed to have the
same preferences for child care, leisure and consumption. It is generally acknowledged
that it is challenging to account for unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice
31When obtaining results similar to those reported in Figure 4 by the conventional model, these
preferences are independent of fathers’ working time and independent of shift work, for both
mothers and fathers.
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Table 5. Estimated preferences for nonparental child care when allowing for two
latent family types
Two unobserved Preferences for center-based care
types of families Probability None Part-time Full-time
Type 1 0.946 0 2.83 (0.53) 3.10 (0.13)
Type 2 0.054 0 23.15 (0.91) 22.60 (0.92)
Number of observations 1,176
Note. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap.
models; see for example Haan (2006) and Train (2009). Since preference for child
care is especially important in our model set-up, we have, in a robustness check,
assessed to what extent results are sensitive to an alternative specification in which
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for formal child care is allowed for. This is
done by letting the parameters γ00 and γ10, see equation 7, differ according to two
latent types of families. The model parameters for each group and the probability
of belonging to each type are obtained simultaneously.
Two types of families are identified, see Table 5: a majority, with a share of 95
%, and a minority, which consists of only 5 % of the families. Parents in the smallest
group have positive preferences for nonparental care, but negative preferences for
longer hours in child care, whereas the estimates based on the majority of families are
in line with the estimated parameters in the benchmark model. Most importantly,
when using this alternative specification in simulations of alternative policies, which
we will return to in Section 6 for the benchmark model, we find that results are not
sensitive to this alternative specification. We take this as corroborative evidence for
the model performing well without introducing unobserved heterogeneity in child
care preferences.
5 Validation of model against quasi-experimental evidence
In this section we discuss the extent to which the predictions given by the model are
supported by results from other information sources. Results from quasi-experimental
analyses are often used to validate structural models (Blundell, 2012), see for example
Todd and Wolpin (2006), Hansen and Liu (2015), and Thoresen and Vattø (2015).
Here, we validate the performance of the model by using a reform in the schedule for
the home care allowance (cash-for-care) in 2012. Responses are measured in terms
of changes in income and in the use of center-based care.
The reform is presented in Table 6. Recall that the home care allowance (cash-
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Table 6. Cash-for-care schedule, pre- and post-reform
Monthly cash-for-care rates (nominal NOK)
Age 13–18 months Age 19–23 months Age 24–35 months
Pre-reform 3,303 3,303 3,303
Post-reform 5,000 3,303 0
Note. To convert to euros and US dollars, divide by 6.05 and 8.01, respectively (2010).
for-care) schedule is a monetary compensation for not using subsidized care at child
care centers, for parents of children aged 1 or 2. Here, we use a reform of the schedule
in 2012 in the model validation. Before 2012, families received approximately NOK
3,300 ($550, €410)32 per child per month, whereas the 2012-change implied that
children aged 13–18 months and 19–23 months received NOK 5,000 ($830, €620)
and NOK 3,300 ($550, €410), respectively; thus eliminating this type of support for
the oldest age group (2-year-old).33
The model simulation results of this change are presented in Table 7, where
we decompose results into effects on families with 1- and 2-year-old children. The
table shows that the qualitative results are as expected – fathers and mothers of the
youngest children reduce their labor supply and the use of center-based care, whereas
opposite effects are seen for parents of the 2-year-old children. As we validate the
model results against responses in labor income, we recalculate the labor supply
effects into corresponding effects on earnings. This is simply done by using the
individual-specific wage rates, derived from the wage equation estimations.34
A major challenge in validity tests is to obtain clear and reliable results from the
empirical studies that are used in the model validation.35 Even though families may
respond along several margins to a change in the budget constraint, as argued by
Feldstein (1995), we assert that in the short run, responses in labor earnings primarily
pick up adjustments in working hours. We have access to income information for the
whole population, derived from administrative registers (Statistics Norway, 2017),
which facilitates detailed studies of income developments for the relatively small
group of couples with children aged 1 and 2. We use similar figures on income
developments for parents with 4-year-old children to portray the counterfactual
32As all simulations are carried out in relation to a 2010-benchmark, conversions to euros and
U.S. dollars are based on exchange rates for 2010.
33After this change the schedule has been adjusted again, such that (from 2017 onwards) there
is only one rate, NOK 7,500 ($910 and €800, for 2017 exchange rates) per month per child, for
1-year-old children.
34Remember that it follows from the modeling approach that individual wage rates are kept
fixed in the simulations.
35We largely replicate an approach described in Weierud (2015).
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Table 7. Model simulations: effects of the 2012-changes in the cash-for-care schedule
on working hours, earnings and use of center-based care
Employment Child care,
Mothers Fathers participation
youngest child 1-year-old (N = 288)
Baseline, working hours/use of care 27.08 37.46 0.806
(0.35) (0.19) (0.014)
Effect of reform, working hours/use of care -0.26 -0.04 -0.016
(0.05) (0.01) (0.003)
Effect of reform, earnings (NOK) -1,175 -253
(221) (67)
youngest child 2-year-old (N = 313)
Baseline working hours/use of care 28.68 37.78 0.894
(0.25) (0.17) (0.008)
Effect of reform, working hours/use of care 0.49 0.08 0.030
(0.07) (0.02) (0.004)
Effect of reform, earnings (NOK) 2,219 471
(326) (107)
Note. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap.
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Table 8. Effects on labor earnings of change in the cash-for-care scheme in 2012.
Results of difference-in-differences regressions, based on income data for 2011 and
2012
Estimate 95 % confidence interval Observations
Mothers, 1-year-olds 677.8 [-1,475 – 2,830] 175,639
Mothers, 2-year-olds 3,143.8∗∗ [1,022 – 5,266] 178,457
Fathers, 1-year-olds -204.0 [-5, 847 – 5,439] 101,159
Fathers, 2-year-olds 108.7 [-5,491 – 5,709] 106,248
Notes. Figures for families of 4-year-old children used as benchmark. Individual control variables included are: age
of parents, age of parents squared, education level, immigrant-background, labor income three years prior to the
reform, and a dummy variable for siblings.∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
common trend. With respect to the use of center-based care, we do not have
individual information that can be used in the present context. We therefore
validate against measures of aggregate coverage rates over the time period, derived
from the yearly reports of child care institutions (Statistics Norway, 2016). Since
average rates are used directly, we cannot compute confidence intervals for these
measures.
Figure 6 presents mean earnings for the time period 2008–2013, comparing
developments for parents of 1-year-old and 2-year-old children with developments for
parents of older children (aged 3 and 4). We see no clear indications of behavioral
responses by visual inspection of the graphs, but when we turn to the results of
difference-in-differences regressions,36 from the same data material, we find that the
income of parents of the 2-year-old children increases, see Table 8.
The observed effects are close to the results of the model simulations presented
in Table 7. Table 8 shows that no significant effects are obtained for the mothers
of the 1-year-old children. However, the standard errors are large, and we note
that the 95 percent confidence interval includes the effect predicted by the model
simulation. The table also confirms that fathers do not respond to the change in
the cash-for-care schedule, as was also predicted by the model simulations. Thus,
we find it reassuring that the predictions of the labor supply model are not far from
the results of the quasi-experimental data analysis. Of course, this only implies that
the model has not been rejected in the validation exercise – it does not mean that
the model has been approved.
The simulated effects on the use of child care centers after the reform are also
36Regressions are based on standard difference-in-differences technology, with the parents of the
4-year-old children representing the common trend.
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Figure 6. Observed earnings (NOK 1,000) and coverage rates in center-based care
by age of children
Notes. Child care information derived from Kindergarten Statistics, for example see Statistics Norway (2016),
based on “Annual reports for kindergartens as of 15 December”. Information on earnings is obtained from Income
and Wealth Statistics for Households.
close to what we see in the data. Figure 6 shows an increase in the child care
coverage rate for 2-year-olds and a decrease for 1-year-olds in 2012, as is also shown
by the average figures (from the same data source), reported in Table 9.37 The
participation rate of the youngest children goes down by 1.2 percentage points,
whereas it increases by 2.6 percentage points for children aged 2. As these figures
are close to the model predictions, see Table 7, this evidence also provides support
for the performance of the model.38
37Thus, this implies that the validation benchmark is established not by using difference-in-
differences micro data techniques in this case, but by aggregate information.
38Simulation results obtained by the restricted model (without endogenous labor supply of
fathers) show a better fit to the quasi-experimental evidence for the mothers of 2-year-old children,
and a worse fit for the mothers of 1-year-olds and the use of child care centers; see results in
appendix in Thoresen and Vattø (2018). With respect to the use of center-based care, simulation
by the alternative model predicts that participation in child care centers for 2-year-olds is 0.037,
which exceeds the results reported in Table 9 (0.026).
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Table 9. Effects on the use of center-based care from change in the cash-for-care





Notes. Results are obtained by simple difference-in-differences calculations using aggregate coverage rates in De-
cember 2011 and December 2012, letting the change in coverage rates for 4-year-olds represent the “common trend”.
6 Further explorations of model properties
6.1 Simulated elasticities
In this section we shall further examine the performance of the model. First we
present simulated labor supply and child care demand elasticities, and next, model
properties are discussed by showing the results of various simulations. Estimates
of labor supply elasticities and child care demand elasticities are obtained from
simulations, in which the wage rate and the child care fees are increased by 10
percent from the baseline.
The elasticity estimates are reported in Table 10, where the labor supply response
is divided into a participation elasticity (extensive margin) and an elasticity condi-
tional on participation (intensive margin); the overall (Marshallian) wage elasticity
is obtained by adding the two estimates. Importantly, and as discussed in detail
in Section 3, given that the model holds no fixed link between working hours and
hours in care, price changes and wage changes have nonidentical effects on parents’
behavior. As we have developed a model for couples, we also provide cross-wage
elasticity estimates.
Note that as the price for nonparental care is not related to hours of use, the
price is essentially zero at the margin.39 This means that at the intensive margin,
an increase in the child care fee can be seen as a pure income effect. Thus, in this
perspective, the finding that the intensive margin price elasticity is essentially zero
is not so unexpected. We also note that the extensive margin demand elasticity with
respect to the fee is small. The previous literature on the price responsiveness of
child care demand does not give clear guidance; for example, the review in Chaplin
et al. (2000) shows estimates ranging from large positive values to large negative
39If the demand for nonparental care is larger than the opening hours of center-based care,
parents may in reality choose other options of nonparental care in addition, which implies that
there is a positive marginal price too.
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Table 10. Simulated elasticities of labor supply and child care demand with respect
to wage and child care fee
Labor supply, Labor supply, Demand for
mother father center-based care
Particip. Hours Particip. Hours Particip. Hours
Wage of mother 0.147 0.120 -0.001 0.004 0.072 0.028
(0.020) (0.018) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
Wage of father -0.004 -0.002 0.021 0.042 0.011 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Price, child care -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.016 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Notes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. The effects on hours of work
are calculated by conditioning on working (intensive margin).
values.
Similarly, we find that fees have a limited effect on the labor supply of both
parents. Again, previous studies do not show consistent results, see surveys on
maternal labor supply effects in Blau and Currie (2006), Kalb (2009), Del Boca
(2015), Morrissey (2017), and Akgunduz and Plantenga (2018). Relatively limited
female labor supply responses to fees are also found by Kornstad and Thoresen
(2007), with Norwegian data from the late nineties, when there were queues for
access to center-based care.40 Another study that finds response estimates close to
zero is Lundin et al. (2008), with data for Sweden. They argue that in countries
with a well-developed and highly subsidized child care system, further reductions in
the price of child care have limited effects on mothers’ labor supply. Thus, this can
explain the low response in the Norwegian case too.
Table 10 shows that the parents’ labor supply is more responsive with respect
to wages than to the price of care. However, there is a clear gender difference –
mothers’ labor supply is more sensitive to the wages than fathers’ work. The overall
wage elasticity for mothers is 0.27 (0.147 + 0.120), which is relatively close to what
Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) found (0.35) when using Norwegian data from the 90s,
and somewhat lower than reported by Thoresen and Vattø (2015) for all Norwegian
females in couples (0.46). Compared to the results of studies of mothers of preschool
children in other countries, the response is higher than, for example, one of the
estimates seen in Ribar (1995) for the US (0.09), but considerably below what Powell
40As there is no rationing in the Norwegian market for child care anymore, one may expect to
find higher price responsiveness in the present situation, not less responsiveness, as was found.
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(2002) finds for Canada (0.85). It is worth noting that the increased labor supply
following from increased wages of mothers, also results in a relatively large increase
in the demand for center-based care, although smaller than the response in working
hours. A key characteristic of our modeling approach is that increased parental
labor supply does not necessarily result in nonparental care on the same scale –
parents may exploit the flexibility in the labor market to let children be taken care
of by the parents.
Given that there are few studies based on models of joint parental labor supply,
the literature offers few estimates of the wage responsiveness of fathers of preschool
children.41 However, we note that the elasticities for males reported here are very
close to the estimates presented in Thoresen and Vattø (2015) for all males (not
restricted to fathers of preschool children). Note also that low responsiveness among
fathers should not be interpreted as evidence of them playing an insignificant role in
family care or the model performing equally well without endogenous male labor
supply (as already discussed in Section 4). In fact, when neglecting the contribution
of males (as implied by a conventional model), the wage responsiveness of females
increases, to 0.178 and 0.144 for participation and hours, respectively; see more
details in Thoresen and Vattø (2018).
As discussed in Section 3, our modeling approach facilitates the derivation of cross-
wage elasticities, which are influenced by how mothers’ and fathers’ consumption of
leisure interact. Recall that we find estimation results in accordance with parents
having preferences for spending time together, as there are stronger preferences for
leisure when the partner has more leisure; see the estimate of β4 in Table 3. Such
preferences limit the cross-wage responses, and correspondingly we see cross-wage
elasticity estimates that are close to zero in Table 10.
6.2 Closing the gender wage gap
In Table 11 we elaborate further on model properties by discussing the extent to
which the different labor market adjustment of men and women can be explained by
differences in wages. More precisely, we use the model to simulate how mothers’ and
fathers’ labor supply is affected when the gender gap in wages is closed. This can
be done in two ways: either by increasing mothers’ wages to the level of fathers’, or
by reducing fathers’ wages down to the level of mothers’; see Table 11. Results are
measured against a benchmark, denoted “Baseline, 2010”.
Firstly, we note that if the mothers obtain “male wages”, they increase their
41One exception is Mumford et al. (2018), who find similar wage elasticities for mothers and
fathers.
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Table 11. Labor supply effects when the gender wage gap is closed
Labor supply, Labor supply, Demand for
mother father center-based care
Particip. Hours Particip. Hours Particip. Hours
Baseline, 2010 0.912 31.91 0.990 38.17 0.913 35.89
(0.006) (0.23) (0.002) (0.16) (0.007) (0.14)
Change from baseline
Increase in wage of mother 0.039 1.27 -0.000 0.02 0.019 0.32
(0.004) (0.20) (0.000) (0.02) (0.003) (0.05)
Decrease in wage of father 0.002 0.08 -0.011 -0.46 -0.003 0.01
(0.002) (0.07) (0.003) (0.08) (0.001) (0.02)
Notes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. The effects on hours of work
are calculated by conditioning on working (intensive margin).
participation rate by 3.9 percentage points. As the difference between participation
between mothers and fathers is approximately 7.8 percent (see the baseline simula-
tion), this means that about half of the difference is explained by higher wages for
males. The rest of the gap in the participation is then explained by other differences,
such as different preferences and unequal opportunities in the labor market. If
we instead decrease the fathers’ wages, the reduction in the participation rate for
fathers is only 1.1 percent, and the participation of mothers increases by only 0.2
percent. The asymmetry in results follows from higher elasticities among mothers
than fathers, in addition to low cross-elasticities, as seen in Table 11. This imbalance
is also found with respect to the results on the intensive margin. An increase in
mothers’ wages explains 1.25 hours (1.27− 0.02) of the difference in hours of work,
whereas an decrease in fathers’ wages leads to a smaller change, only 0.54 hours
(0.08 + 0.046).
6.3 More on the effects of parental fees
Recent family policy discussions in Norway have centered on whether to make child
care services cheaper or to strengthen cash benefits schedules. Given this, and given
that the elasticity estimates suggest that parents’ labor supply is rather insensitive to
child care fees, we take a closer look at the effects of larger changes in payments for
center-based care. In Table 12 we report the simulated effects of alternative pricing
schemes for nonparental care, both letting the price be doubled and making the
service free. Moreover, in order to look further into the heterogeneity of responses,
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simulation results for specific groups of households are presented – for families where
both parents are immigrants and for families where mothers are low-educated or
have low predicted wage rates.
The results of Table 12 signify that the relationship between the price of non-
parental care and the labor supply of mothers follows a nonlinear pattern. Although
Table 10 shows that labor supply is very insensitive to the price of care, close to zero,
we see clearer effects when introducing larger changes, such as a doubling of the
parental fee (from the level of 2010).42 As expected, mothers decrease their labor
supply. Correspondingly, they increase their labor supply when they are offered
full-time center-based care free of charge. The labor supply of fathers is almost
unaffected by these changes.
With respect to the selected subgroups, the most distinct deviation from the
responses of the overall population is seen for the category of families with low paid
mothers. For the simulation alternative where they experience a doubled price for
nonparental care, the average reduction in hours of labor supply is 0.4 for mothers
and 0.1 for fathers. This is not a large response, for example compared to what
other studies find, but clearly higher than for the whole population. It should also
be acknowledged that many of the confidence intervals are relatively wide.
6.4 Abolition of the cash-for-care scheme
In the validation of the model we used a change in the cash-for-care scheme in 2012.
However, the removal of the program is an ever returning question in the Norwegian
policy debate, having for instance been recently suggested by a governmentally
appointed expert group (Ministry of Children and Equality, 2017). In Table 13 we
report the simulated effects of abolishing the scheme altogether, i.e., eliminating
the schedule reported as the pre-reform schedule in Table 6. Recall that support to
eligible families is substantial, NOK 3,300 ($550, €410) per child per month. Despite
this, the responses are again very small on average for all individuals. Effects are
larger when restricted to the target population of the schedule, but even in that
group the effects are fairly small: labor supply participation increases by 0.64 hours
and participation in center-based care increases by 4.0 percentage points. Given
that the model also involves responses on the standard versus shift work margin,
Table 13 also reports the effects on the choice of shift work. However, although
we see that families change to less shift work when the cash-for care schedule is
eliminated, the effects are not significant.
42In 2010 the maximum price was NOK 2,330, or approx. $385 and €290.
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Table 12. Simulated effects on hours of work and hours in care of alternative child
care fee schemes. Effects on all households and population subgroups
Labor supply Labor supply, Demand,
mother father center-based care
All households (N = 1, 176)
Baseline (2010) 29.16 (0.25) 37.79 (0.16) 32.77 (0.28)
Change from baseline schedule
2 x maximum price -0.16 (0.08) -0.03 (0.02) -0.53 (0.09)
Free full-time care 0.14 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01) 0.35 (0.04)
mothers with non-norwegian background (N = 297)
Baseline (2010) 27.67 (0.63) 37.41 (0.23) 32.24 (0.57)
Change from baseline
2 x maximum price -0.20 (0.07) -0.05 (0.03) -0.55 (0.73)
Free full-time care 0.15 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01) 0.35 (0.67)
mothers with low education (N = 182)
Baseline (2010) 26.59 (0.80) 37.21 (0.23) 31.82 (0.41)
Change from baseline
2 x maximum price -0.21 (0.06) -0.05 (0.02) -0.57 (0.52)
Free full-time care 0.16 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.37 (0.50)
mothers with low predicted wage rate (N = 150)
Baseline (2010) 25.30 (0.55) 37.20 (0.24) 30.69 (0.59)
Change from baseline
2 x maximum price -0.38 (0.10) -0.11 (0.04) -0.88 (0.69)
Free full-time care 0.25 (0.04) 0.04 (0.01) 0.53 (0.54)
Notes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. Effects on hours of work
measure unconditional effects (both extensive and intensive margins).
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Table 13. Simulated effects of abolishing the “cash-for-care” schedule
Labor supply Labor supply, Demand,
mother father center-based care
Hours Shift share Hours Shift share Particip. Hours
All households (N = 1, 176)
Baseline (2010) 29.16 0.218 37.79 0.230 0.913 35.89
(0.25) (0.008) (0.16) (0.009) (0.007) (0.14)
Change from baseline
No “cash-for-care” 0.33 -9.5·10−5 0.05 -5.2·10−4 0.021 0.00
(0.05) (0.001) (0.01) (0.001) (0.003) (0.00)
“Cash-for-care” eligible households (N = 601)
Baseline (2010) 27.90 0.222 37.63 0.233 0.851 35.72
(0.28) (0.010) (0.17) (0.009) (0.011) (0.18)
Change from baseline
No “cash-for-care” 0.64 -1.9·10−4 0.10 -1.0·10−3 0.040 0.00
(0.09) (0.001) (0.02) (0.001) (0.005) (0.00)
Notes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by non-parametric bootstrap. The effects on hours of work
refer to the total effect (both intensive and extensive margin). The “shift share” is the share of individuals with
work outside the standard weekday hours of between 6am and 6pm.
38
7 Concluding remarks
Developments in Norway and several other countries imply that there is reason to
question the design of the typical structural model for joint labor supply and child
care choice. In particular, we assert that the negligence of fathers as caregivers can
no longer be justified with reference to the decision-making of Norwegian families.
Even though Norway and other Nordic countries are regarded as taking the lead
with respect to equal parenting and support for center-based care, we expect that
the model presented here represents a relevant approach for other economies too.
Two new characteristics in particular are taken into account to in the design of
the updated model. Firstly, the choice set of nonparental care has been simplified –
in effect, parents now choose between own care and center-based care. Secondly, in
contrast, the decision-making on the parental side has become more complicated.
It is asserted that Norwegian couples are moveing towards more gender equality
in family life, which implies that care by fathers should also be accounted for in
the care choice set. As both parents are assumed to take part in the care, and
parents’ working hours may not overlap, a model is developed that accounts for
the possibility that parents may exploit labor market flexibility to reduce time in
nonparental care.
The simulation results suggest that parents’ labor supply is rather insensitive
to the price of child care. This finding is supported, or at least not rejected, by
validations against other information sources. Model simulation results are relatively
close to findings derived from quasi-experimental data analysis, using a reform in
the cash-for-care scheme as an out-of-sample validation.
Further, even though simulation results suggest that parents are not responding
to changes in the price of center-based care, they show more responsiveness with
respect to changes in wages. The model predicts that mothers more than fathers
increase their labor supply in response to an increase in their wages. The average
wage elasticity for mothers is 0.27, whereas fathers are much less responsive: their
wage elasticity is around 0.06. The cross-wage elasticity estimates are small. The
labor supply effects generated by increased wages for mothers result in increased
demand for center-based care, but not in the same range as given by the labor supply
response. This reflects the key characteristic of our model: we allow parents exploit
the flexibility in the labor market to spend more time with their children at home,
and, in particular, we allow the fathers to contribute to the caregiving.
We find results that confirm that fathers are involved in care, although most
likely not on the same scale as their partners. Our estimation results seem to suggest
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that Norwegian fathers still have a way to go before they are involved in caretaking at
the same level as their female counterparts. But we expect that fathers will continue
on the path to a more equal position in family caregiving. Moreover, we hypothesize
that the greater involvement of fathers is spreading to other economies too. In that
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Table A.1. OLS wage regressions
Mothers Fathers
Experience 0.0688∗∗∗ (0.0150) 0.0202 (0.0040)
Experience squared -0.0017∗∗ (0.0005) -0.0005 (0.0001)
Low education -0.3323∗∗∗ (0.0781) -0.2121∗ (0.0921)
High education 0.2296∗∗∗ (0.0486) 0.2672∗∗∗ (0.0471)
Education category (base: “unknown”)
General 0.4833∗∗∗ (0.0886) 0.2570∗∗ (0.0969)
Human/art 0.3057∗∗ (0.0999) -0.0999 (0.1185)
Education 0.2943∗∗ (0.0909) 0.0085 (0.1165)
Social/law 0.5078∗∗∗ (0.1051) 0.0206 (0.1167)
Business 0.4942∗∗∗ (0.0844) 0.3180∗∗ (0.0892)
Technology 0.6091∗∗∗ (0.0930) 0.2616∗∗ (0.0691)
Health 0.4319∗∗∗ (0.0782) 0.1475 (0.1011)
Primary 0.4504∗ (0.2035) -0.1384 (0.1368)
Service 0.4203∗∗ (0.1622) 0.2780∗∗ (0.1006)
Constant 4.1004∗∗∗ (0.1274) 4.9824∗∗∗ (0.1279)
Number of observations 1,144 1,176
Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A.1. Distribution of observed working hours and hours in center-based care
Notes. The dashed lines illustrate the chosen boundaries points when discretizing the observed choices into “None”
(0), “Part-time” (1–34), “Full-time” (35–41), and “Overtime” (41+) for mothers’ and fathers’ working time, and
“None” (0), “Part-time” (11–35), and “Full-time” (36+) for center-based care.
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Table A.2. Complete list of estimated parameters
Variables Parameter Estimate Std. error
Preference, v(C, hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Consumption, v1(C)
Intercept α0 0.1462∗∗∗ (0.0319)
Squared term α1 -0.0002 (0.0001)
Leisure, v2(hm, hf , sm, sf )
Mother’s leisure β10 8.6351∗∗∗ (1.3601)
Age β11 0.0809∗∗ (0.0301)
Immigrant status β12 -0.1396 (0.3118)
Low education β13 -0.0424 (0.4011)
High education β14 -0.4449 (0.3266)
Number of preschool children β15 0.5868∗ (0.2385)
Father’s leisure β20 0.4899 (1.8071)
Age β21 0.0618 (0.0381)
Immigrant status β22 0.6242 (0.4962)
Low education β23 1.2838∗ (0.6179)
High education β24 -0.5299 (0.5173)
Number of preschool children β25 0.4491 (0.4004)
Interaction β3 -0.2739 (1.0996)
Interaction, standard schedules β4 1.7512∗∗∗ (0.3871)
Nonparental child care, v3(q)
Intercept γ00 0.0143 (1.9183)
Age of the child γ01 1.6227∗∗∗ (0.3680)
Squared term γ10 -3.9584∗ (1.8893)
Age of the child γ11 -0.8030∗∗ (0.2898)
Care int., v4(hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Leisure of mother×care δ11 1.2855 (1.8223)
Leisure of father×care δ21 -2.6700 (2.4433)
Shift mother×care δ31 2.4286∗∗ (0.8818)
Shift father×care δ41 1.5375 (0.8416)
Leisure of mother×care sq. δ12 -8.7768∗∗∗ (1.7024)
Leisure of father×care sq. δ22 0.1227 (2.3964)
Shift mother×care sq. δ32 -3.2690∗∗∗ (0.8195)
Shift father×care sq. δ42 -1.5480 (0.7985)
Note. ∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Variables Parameter Estimate Std. error
Opportunity, b(hm, hf , sm, sf , q)
Nonparticipation, mother gno,m -1.6315∗∗∗ (0.2127)
Nonparticipation, father gno,f -0.1307 (0.3877)
Full-time, mother gfull,m 1.4244∗∗∗ (0.0883)
Full-time, father gfull,f 1.5965∗∗∗ (0.0794)
Shift work, mother, ς1
Intercept ς10 -0.8720 (0.3871)
Field of education
General ς11 0.7372∗ (0.3326)
Human/art ς12 0.2069∗ (0.4451)
Education ς13 -0.8412 (0.4430)
Social/law ς14 -1.2357 (0.6623)
Business/administration ς15 -0.3261 (0.4048)
Natural sciences/technology ς16 -0.1625 (0.4508)
Health ς17 1.6334∗∗∗ (0.3211)
Service ς18 0.4378 (0.7115)
Shift work, father, ς2
Intercept ς20 -0.3528 (0.3028)
Field of education
General ς21 -0.1444 (0.2633)
Human/art ς22 -0.2837 (0.4027)
Education ς23 -1.7118∗∗ (0.5647)
Social/law ς24 -1.0419∗ (0.4622)
Business/administration ς25 -1.0552∗∗ (0.3333)
Natural sciences/technology ς26 -0.9809∗∗∗ (0.2463)
Health ς27 0.2648 (0.3196)
Primary industries ς28 -0.7173 (0.5438)
Service ς29 0.1434 (0.3275)
Decoupling work/care κ -0.1687 (0.1644)
Number of observations 1,176
Note. ∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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